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Abstract 
This essay will summarize and study existing theories and the recent 
developments regarding long-term incentive (LTI) plans in Swedish 
companies listed on Nasdaq OMX Stockholm. The underlying theory is 
the principal-agent problem that arises in public companies, which 
highlights the behavioural aspects of decision-making for employees in a 
managerial position. This study aims to provide evidence that LTI plans 
aimed at the executive management result in increased financial 
performance. The period to which the study relates is 2009 to 2012, 
analysing company profit from the year of implementation and three year 
forward. There is empirical evidence that increased profits can be 
associated with having an LTI plan in mid- and small-size companies, 
which indicates that the value of financial incentives is measureable. The 
data sample shows that shares are more prevalent in large companies and 
options in smaller companies. An analysis on the use of shares and options 
shows a correlation between instruments used and firm performance, 
which strengthens the implication of a potential LTI effect. Finally, there 
are further evidence that LTI have an impact on employee turnover but no 
evidence on an impact on leverage. This suggests that the use of financial 
incentives do to some extent retain managers but the level of risk measured 
in leverage is not quantifiable.  
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1. Introduction 
1.1. Background 
The basic premise of this essay is the evolving topic of remuneration as part of corporate 
governance. The ongoing scrutiny of reward levels in the light of share price performance 
continue to be debated in the media. The quantifiable nature of these schemes are criticised by 
public officials, shareholders and academics alike. This topic is of great interest of mine and I 
see a lot of potential to improve remuneration standards in Sweden. There has been recent 
progress over the past years to improve the standard of corporate governance through political 
reforms and regulatory changes. One catalyst for change in Europe is the proposed ‘say on pay’ 
directive aimed at creating a link between pay and performance, and a greater engagement 
between shareholders and executives. The European Union has presented changes to the 
Shareholder Rights Directive (Directive 2007/36/EC) in order to handle corporate governance 
issues relating to public companies, shareholders, intermediaries and proxy advisors (i.e. firms 
providing services to shareholders).
1
 As the financial crisis (2008) showed, shareholders 
frequently tend to support managers’ excessive short-term risk taking and fail to monitor 
investment decisions more closely.
 
Furthermore, tougher auditing standards and increased 
transparency with regard to employee financial incentives have led to new and improved reward 
structures.
 
The new regulatory framework mainly strives to increase long-term focus, with 
respect to incentive schemes for the executive management.
 
In modern corporations, executive 
management is the one empowered to make decisions that has an impact on share price and 
future financial growth.
2
 Previous studies
3,4,5,6
 discuss that the use of incentives has increased 
over the past decades as it has proven to tie pay and performance.  Furthermore, in the existing 
competitive market companies have to focus on new technology, which has resulted in a more 
‘human capital’ intensive environment. Fama7 argues that long-term incentive schemes are 
                                                 
1
 Press release, European Commission proposes to strengthen shareholder engagement and introduce a "say on pay" 
for Europe’s largest companies, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-396 
2
 Ellig B. (2007, p.402-526) 
3
 
 
Mehran H. (1995, p.163-184) 
4
 Sanders G. (2001b)  
5
 Brickley J. A. (1991, p.70-84) 
6
 Huselid A. M. (1995, p.635-872) 
7
 Fama E. F. (1980)   
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critical in order to attract and retain key employees, especially in ‘human capital’ intensive 
industries, as loosing valuable human capital can be costly for a firm. Furthermore, financial 
incentives are utilised to increase overall efficiency where top managers monitor and motivate 
lower level management and employees in a ‘top-down’ approach. Zingales8 describes a “new 
theory of the firm” which argues that when companies become more ‘human capital’ intensive, 
traditional corporate finance becomes inefficient. In order to find new market opportunities and 
innovations to drive capital growth, talented people are essential for success.  
The primary purpose of LTI plans is to increase executive ownership in the company, thereby 
incentivising management to implement profitable business strategies. There is a plethora of 
literature on financial incentives, discussing at great length the link between managers and 
shareholders, and the impact pay has on performance. However, the conclusions on the actual 
effects are rather polarised with many contradictory findings. Meckling
9
, one of the early 
researchers on this subject, notes that the underlying theory of each study is the conflict that 
arises between shareholders and managers in a principal agent problem, based on the separation 
of ownership and control manifested in public companies. Bamberg
10
 describes how financial 
incentives can be utilised to control management behaviour and potentially eliminate the agency 
problem. Mehran
11
 argues that the shareholders do not have direct insight into the company and 
cannot monitor investment opportunities, therefore focus has to be shifted towards reducing the 
agency problem. To this effect, LTI plans are designed to mitigate the agency problem and the 
associated costs, and align the interest between shareholders and managers. 
 
The agency theory addresses issues such as asymmetric information and different risk 
preferences. Greenwald
12
 explains how asymmetries of shareholders and managers have led to 
new developments in which companies acquire and deploy capital. The source of a firm’s 
financial performance lies in factors such as R&D investments, increased leverage, acquisition 
prospects, debt financing, cash reserves and other factors that have an impact on capital 
                                                 
8
 Zingales L. (2000, p.1623-1655)  
9
 Meckling M. C. (1976, p.305-360) , et al  
10
 Bamberg G. (1989) 
11
 Mehran H. (1995, p.163-184) 
12
 Greenwald B. C. (1990, p.160-165) 
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structure. Coles
13
 provides evidence of a strong correlation between managerial incentives and 
investment policy, debt policy and firm risk. The study shows that the compensation structure is 
associated with more R&D investments, less investment in ‘Property, plant and equipment’ and 
higher leverage. The issues that arise vary depending on the type of company and the level of 
growth opportunities. Bizjak
14
 notes that high growth (e.g. software, pharmaceutical) firms have 
higher level of asymmetric information as it focuses on new products and growth opportunities, 
which may take years to develop. Furthermore, industrial companies should have lower 
asymmetric information as it focuses more on producing/marketing existing products. Therefore, 
high growth companies should focus more on incentive schemes to reduce the agency problem. 
Along with asymmetric information, managers tend to have different risk exposure. Rajgopal
15
 
notes that managers are portrayed as risk-averse individuals and shareholders as risk-neutral, 
seeking investments to maximize profit. This study investigates the relation between executive 
stock options and volatility, the result suggests that financial incentives motivate managers to 
invest in more high risk projects. Datta
16
 investigated the potential effects financial incentives 
had on acquisition decisions, providing evidence that post-acquisition performance is higher in 
companies with high equity-based compensation. This supports the existing theory – that board 
and shareholders can affect managerial decisions by incentivising.  
Researchers are striving to find the optimal incentive mechanism for managers to make more 
value-creating decisions. Furthermore, increased ownership structure align a manager’s wealth 
with firm performance, which in return should maximize company pay-off as managers tend to 
seek ways to maximize their own utility. Prevailing econometric studies have shown that LTI 
plans can be associated with company growth. Brickley
17
 provides evidence of a link between 
LTI plans and productivity. The study concludes that financial incentives have an impact on 
behaviour, suggesting that employees are less likely to harm the company and more likely to act 
in a value-enhancing manner. Huselid
18
 provides an extended study showing that financial 
incentives can be associated with increased productivity, performance and decreased employee 
                                                 
13
 Coles J. L (2006, p.431-468) 
14
 Bizjak J. M.(1993, p.431-468) 
15
 Rajgopal S. (2002, p.145-171) 
16
 Datta S. (2001, p.2299-2336) 
17
 Brickley J. A. (1991, p.70-84) 
18
 Huselid A. M. (1995, p.635-872) 
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turnover. In contrast, Yermack
19
 found insignificant correlation between incentives and growth 
opportunities, and incentives and financial leverage. The study argues that the existing agency 
theories have little explanatory power with regard to incentive rewards, contradicting the agency 
theory framework, but highlights the noisiness data in such studies. Mehran
20
 tests the impact of 
compensation structures (instead of compensation levels) on firm performance. The results show 
a significant positive correlation between high equity based compensation as percentage of total 
pay and firm performance, providing evidence that the reward structure has a measurable impact 
on firm efficiency.  In a more recent study, Frye
21
 found significant correlation between financial 
incentives and firms performance, suggesting that incentivised managers tend to focus more on 
growth and investment opportunities. All support the assumption that financial incentives 
mitigate the conflict between managers and shareholders.  
1.2. Problem description  
This essay focuses on internal structure (rewarding employees) and external structure 
(company’s financial position). There are contradictory findings in prevailing theories if 
incentive mechanisms can hamper the agency problem. New theory of the firm goes beyond the 
traditional neo-classical model and discusses asymmetric dilemmas and risk-behaviour in 
corporate finance. There has been increased attention in the media about the financial 
implications of financial incentives, as public companies tend to have a significant amount of 
shareholders. Furthermore, as shareholders want to maximize the return of their investment, the 
prevalence of financial incentives is increasing among public companies. This study will shed 
light on what remains unclear, whether or not financial incentives can improve a company’s 
financial position. This study focuses on public companies listed on the Nasdaq OMX 
Stockholm. By mapping out LTIs in Sweden, the reader will gain an insight into the Swedish 
market. The main hypothesis will extend previous findings that LTIs have a positive impact on 
firm performance.   
H1: LTI plans increase firm performance in Swedish listed companies.   
 
                                                 
19
 Yermack D. (1995, p.237-269) 
20
 Mehran H. (1995, p.163-184) 
21
 Frye M. (2004, p.31-54) 
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Recent attention on the optimal incentive design suggests that well-designed plans should 
increase long-term performance. Shares and options have different costs, regulations, taxes and 
incentive effect applied to them. Depending on the company’s size, maturity, capital and 
organisational structure, different instruments are preferable. The possible effect instruments 
have on firm performance will be tested in a second hypothesis:  
 
H2: There is a correlation between type of instruments used and firm performance in Swedish 
listed companies.   
 
Existing theories discuss the impact on corporate governance. Financial incentives are supposed 
to induce risk-taking, attract new talents and retain employees in a firm. Following Huselid
22
, 
Yermack
23
 and the agency theory problems, an additional hypothesis will test the impact 
financial incentives have on corporate governance.  
H3: LTI plans have a measurable impact on corporate governance in Swedish listed companies.  
 
1.3. Purpose of study 
The purpose of this study is to extend previous research about the outcome of LTI plans aimed at 
the executive management. Few previous studies have explicitly studied the relation between 
LTI plans and firm performance in Swedish listed companies.  
                                                 
22
 Huselid A. M. (1995, 635-872) 
23
 Yermack D. (1995, p.237-269) 
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1.4. Disposition 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
Introduce the topic, background and 
hypothesis 
Theoretical frame of reference 
Provide theory behind the topic 
Empirical methodology 
Describe the statistical approach 
Empirical study 
Present data and descriptive statistics 
Empirical result 
Hypothesis testing and result of the study 
Conclusion 
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2. Theoretical frame of reference 
2.1. Corporate Governance in Sweden 
Corporate governance consists of internal (directed) and external (controlled) parts and corporate 
governance differs between countries.
24
 Corporate governance is intended to “ensure that 
companies are run as efficiently as possible on behalf of their shareholders” 25. This positive 
development in corporate governance is supposed to increase confidence in public companies.
 26
 
 
The need for rules and governance has increased over the past years along with the emergence of 
institutional investors.
27
 The Swedish Code of Corporate Governance (2004/2008) was 
implemented in 2005 and targeted public companies on a stock exchange with a market value of 
SEK 3 billion or more. This was revised in 2008 targeting all public companies listed on 
NASDAQ OMX Stockholm (about 300 companies) with a “comply or explain” principle, which 
means that a company may depart from rules in the code if explaining the reason why. The code 
regarding remuneration to executive management was revised in 2010 regarding financial 
instruments. The revised rules are based on the EU commission’s recommendation in 2009 
(2009/385/EC).
28
  
 
In comparison to the US, Swedish corporate governance has a more principle-based approach, 
defined by laws, self-regulation and practice. The most important law is the Companies Act and 
self-regulations consist of the Stock Exchange’s rules and the Swedish Corporate Governance 
Code. The Swedish Company Act (Sw. Aktiebolagslagen) is focused on shareholders’ rights and 
corporate governance issues, which includes principles of remuneration. Swedish institutions 
also have a concentrated ownership where the ownership is dominated by large shareholders. 
These owners are expected to take long-term responsibility and have an active role in corporate 
governance. The corporate governance also includes string ownership power (Dual 
                                                 
24
 Lannoo K. (1995) 
25
 Swedish Corporate Governance Board (2010) 
26
 Ibid 
27
 Ibid 
28
 Lekvall P. (2009)    
13 
 
shares/Differentiated Voting Rights), protection of minority rights and high transparency 
standards.
29
  
2.2. Separation of ownership and control 
The separation of ownership and control goes back to early 1930s as the great depression hit the 
U.S. This phenomenon changed the capital market in companies and a new view on corporations 
took shape. Berle and Means was one of the early academics to define the “separation of 
ownership and control”. They stated how “new conditions has developed” in modern 
corporations. The underlying assumption is that when owners transfer control of its assets to 
someone else, a separation issue occurs where the owners can no longer control for decisions and 
financial growth.
30
  
2.3. Principal-agent theory 
According to Eisenhardt
31
 the foundation of the principal-agent theory is the self-interest in 
organizations, i.e. the assumption that people will benefit themselves to the greatest possible 
extent when the opportunity arises. Meckling, et al
32
 notes that the foundation in the agency 
problem lies in the agency problem that arises in the “separation of ownership and control” in 
public companies.  Garen
33
 defines the agency problem as a situation where the principal cannot 
influence the decision of the agent and the agent tries to minimize their own efforts by ignoring 
actual consequences. The problem can be solved by establishing incentives for the agent and 
induce “monitoring costs” designed to limit certain activities of the agent, i.e. by verifying what 
the agent is doing. In addition, the principal can pay the agent “bonding costs” to guarantee that 
the agent will not take certain actions that would harm the principal.. Meckling
34
 describes the 
model as parties making decisions in a two person-game, i.e. shareholders decide on incentives 
in order to control the management’s effort and financial decisions. The model is a contractual 
relationship where one person (the principal) engages another person (the agent) with incentives 
to act on his behalf as the other person has decision-making authority. Meckling
35
 notes that if 
                                                 
29
 Lekvall P. (2009)    
30
 Cheffins S. (2009, p.443-474) 
31
 Eisenhardt K. (1989) 
32
 Meckling M. C. (1976, p.305-360) et al 
33
 Garen J. E. (1994, 1175-1199) 
34
 Meckling M. C. (1976, p.305-360) 
35
 Ibid 
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people are utility-maximisers, there is a good chance that the agent will act in his own interest 
and not in the interest of the principal. Furthermore, stated there will always be uncertain and 
imperfect “monitoring costs” and “bonding costs” and a residual loss between the agents’ 
decision and the principals’ utility. According to Pepper36 companies strive to reach an 
equilibrium in contractual form, characterizing the relationship between the managers and the 
shareholders. The agency theory is a general theory and exists in all cooperative organizations at 
all management levels. 
2.3.1. Asymmetric information 
According to Harris
37
 the absence of information or assymtric distribution of information is 
characterized by the agency problem. He notes that there is need to invest resources to gain 
information in order to assure a pareto-efficient allocation of resources. In lines with this, 
Poblete
38
 argues that there are two aspects of the agency problem; adverse selection and moral 
hazard. In an agency problem with adverse selection, the main objective is to reveal hidden 
information and gain insight into the company. In a moral hazard problem, the cost is to induce 
incentives to prevent potential harmful actions. This study addresses how the agency problem 
can occur in different situations, for example, in start-ups for example, the principal is an 
investor and the agent is an entrepreneur, where the investor want to monitor the investment for 
potential return. The agency problem can be described in a model, where a is the cost of the 
agent, i.e. action where Π (output) depends on θ (state) 
Π = Π (θ,a) 
The principal can observe the economic output but not the input of the current state or the 
agents’ effort. To reduce this problem studies discuss optimal contracting. This consists of two 
aspects; to provide the agent with incentives to perform, and to compensate the principal for the 
investment. The optimal contract varies depending on the situation, payment function and effort 
level that maximizes the principals expected net-benefit.
 39
   
                                                 
36
 Pepper A. (2013, p.36-51) 
37
 Harris M. (1978, p.231-259) 
38
 Poblete J. (2012, p. 305-360) 
39
 Ibid 
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2.3.2. Risk preferences 
According to Harris
40
 another problem that arises in this model is the difference in risk-
preference between the principal and agent. The agent is characterized as a risk-averse 
individual, unlike the principals who are risk-neutral. Meckling
41
 argues that if the agent does 
not bear any financial risk, aligning the agent’s wealth with the financial outcome will 
incentivised the manager to take risk. This means that the agent will seek opportunities to 
maximise his own wealth, which implies that the agent values own return higher than actual 
return on investment. Rajgopal
42
 claims that by increasing the convexity of the managers’ wealth 
and firm performance there is a significant impact on the risk-taking behaviour and risk appetite.
 
 
2.4. Long-term incentive Plans 
The number of LTI plans in Sweden has been increasing over the past decades but have been 
prevalent in the U.S for a long time.
43
 More than half of the Swedish companies today have LTI 
plans in place.
44
 Historically in Sweden, LTI have developed from simplified capital gain taxed 
securities in the 70-80s to more advanced design structures in the 2000. The use of different 
instruments has shifted from convertibles in 70s to employee stock options in the the 90s and to 
performance shares in the 2000 until today.
45
 The basic principles of LTIs are to retain talent, 
encourage capital accumulation, drive company performance, promote stock price appreciation 
and promote ownership.
46
 In order to implement efficient LTI plans, companies should evaluate 
corporate governance, performance management and financials. Most LTI plans are regulated 
under civil law, The Swedish Company Act, unless stated otherwise. According to The Swedish 
Company Act, all plans that require equity issuance have to be proposed and approved at the 
AGM.
47
  
 
An LTI plan is a long-term variable pay component commonly based on a multi-year vesting or 
lock-in period
48
.
 
LTI plans use financial instruments such as shares or options, or cash-
                                                 
40
 Harris M. (1978, p.231-259) 
41
 Meckling M. C. (1976, p.305-360) 
42
 Rajgopal S. (2002, p.145-171) 
43
 Smitt R. (2002) 
44
 See table 2 under Descriptive Statistics p. 24 
45
 Edhall K. (2011) 
46
 Becker I. S. (2009) 
47
 Smitt R. (2002, p.88-89) 
48
 Lekvall P. (2009) 
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settlements that the employees either buy at full value, subsidized value or free of charge
49
. 
There are numerous different plan designs to optimize perceived value and reward employees. If 
the program forfeits there may be negative incentive consequences, especially for the employee 
who invested own money or who accepted less salary to be able to participate. This can lead to a 
de-motivating effect on employees, which impacts work moral and create mistrust.
50
 In Swedish 
companies, the requirement to make own investments in order to participate has become more 
prevalent. Companies’ rationale is that active risk-taking should be a prerequisite to participate. 
Instead of giving away incentive rewards for “free”, there is a potential downside for bad 
performance.
51
  
2.4.1. Stock options 
A stock option entitles the employee (holder) to buy the underlying stock of the issuing company 
at a fixed exercise price (usually grant date fair market value) until the expiry date. The options 
usually have a vesting period of three years, and after that period the employee can exercise the 
options at any time before expiry.
52
 The value of the option is based on the underlying assets 
market value, i.e. value of the share-price. The Black & Scholes model
53
 is commonly applied 
when valuing options. This model uses factors such as value of underlying asset, exercise price, 
vesting period, risk free interest rate, volatility and dividends on the underlying asset. The 
underlying asset is expected to increase in value. If the underlying asset declines in value, the 
holder will not exercise the option. Buying options requires less capital as an initial investment. 
Options in an option plan are issued by the company itself and the premium paid is often 
subsidized.
54
 The options have a binary outcome if it rewards the employee or not. Rising stock 
prices makes stock options a favourable choice but a market swing in the opposite direction can 
make the options worthless.
 
Some argue that stock options encourage managers to manipulate 
stock prices, however this seems unlikely today as government and regulators monitor all 
company activates.
55
 
                                                 
49
 Ellig B. (2007, p.402-526) 
50
 Ibid 
51
 Edhall K. (2011) 
52
 Satterfield B. (2002, p.17.21)      
53
 Option valuation model, see Brealy R. A. (1996, p.577-579) 
54
 Smitt R. (2002, p.42-54) 
55
 Ellig B. (2007, p.402-526) 
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2.4.1.1. Call Option plan  
A Call Option plan uses options that gives the participant the option to purchase shares in the 
company. The options are issued by the company itself or commonly in larger companies by 
financial institution. The normal vesting period is three years before exercise. A call option is a 
written agreement between the issuer and the employee.
56
  This type of plan can be highly 
motivating as it provides unlimited upside potential based on stock appreciation without 
company cash expenditure.
57
  
2.4.1.2. Employee Stock Option plan  
The Employee Stock Option (ESO) plan uses options tied to employment, commonly with a 
multi-year vesting period with conditions attached. It requires the employee to be employed 
contingent upon date of exercise. If the employee leaves before date of exercise the option is 
forfeited and not transferable.
58
 For an option to be classified as “employee stock option” it has 
to be aimed at employees, not transferrable, free of premium and tied to employment.
59
 An ESO 
is by tax regulations per definition not a security. The definition of employee stock options is 
solely used in the context of tax law as it has specific taxation rules applied to it.
60
 ESO are 
taxable upon exercise and as income rather than capital gain unlike other financial securities. 
This reduces the risk of unforeseen taxation.
61
 
2.4.1.3. Warrants plan  
Warrants is a contractual instrument and alike stock options entitles the holder the right to 
subscribe to issued shares at a fixed price within a set period of time. Unlike options, warrants 
are guaranteed to reward shares at date of exercise.
62
 The differences between a warrant and an 
option are that the option can use already existing shares at exercise whilst the warrants result in 
an equity issuance, which is a high cost for shareholders as it creates dilution. The holder of 
warrants does not have voting rights.
63
 The issuance of warrants is regulated under civil law. 
Warrants are effective in public companies or when companies planning an IPO to create 
                                                 
56
 Smitt R. (2002, p.54-56) 
57
 Kay I. (2009) 
58
 Borg M. (2003) 
59
 Smitt R. (2002, p.45) 
60
 Borg M. (2003) 
61
 Ibid  
62
 Smitt R. (2002, p.57-63) 
63
 Borg M. (2003)  
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retention.
64
 However, warrants are sensitive to market volatility and can pay out even if company 
underperforms. This can result in a less focus on operational performance and more focus on 
market performance.  
2.4.2. Shares plans 
Shares plans are a 100 % stock award and can be given immediately at grant date or restricted 
(be locked-in over a period). Employees either make an own investment or receive shares from 
the company. Most share plans uses some sort or performance target in order to receive payment 
or gain additional shares. An employee that participates in a share plan gains direct ownership in 
company shares, which creates immediate value.
65
  
2.4.2.1. Performance shares plan 
Performance shares plan uses shares with a conditional grant tied to a set of predetermined 
performance targets over the plan period. The plan requires that the participant first self-invest in 
company shares (“saving shares”). The Performance shares are forfeited if the goals have not 
been achieved.
66
 Usually the shareholders prefer this instrument as it is supposed to eliminate 
any “give away” perception of the plan. Companies use different type of performance targets to 
reflect financial goals.
67
 This plan has a strong link between pay and performance and is often 
perceived positively by shareholders and proxy advisors. It can focus on both operational and 
share price performance. Some challenging aspects are to find a suitable performance target that 
drive value creation.
68
  
Performance targets 
The performance targets in LTI plans are either financial or non-financial goals or the two 
combined to increase incentives. The performance objectives should reflect the company’s 
business strategy and financial goals. Companies gain from goal-based incentives as it creates 
stronger linkages between decision, long-term values and rewards.
69
  Financial targets are 
accounting based goals, e.g. EBITDA, EBIT, EPS etc. Non-financial targets are share-price 
based targets, usually TSR. Both financial and non-financial targets uses either absolute or 
                                                 
64
 Borg M. (2003) 
65
 Ellig B. (2007, p.402-526) 
66
 Satterfield B. (2002, p.17.21)      
67
 Ericson R. N (2010) 
68
 Ibid 
69
 Ericsson R.N (2014) 
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relative measures, which means to measure actual company performance or compare 
performance relative to a peer group.
70
  
2.4.2.2. Matching shares plan 
Matching shares are commonly used in a Performance shares plan. It requires that the participant 
first self-invest in company shares (“saving shares”), which is then matched with additional 
shares after a lock-up period. This usually requires that the participant is employed in the 
company during the entire vesting period.
71
 Matching share plan is an effective retention and 
motivational tool as the participant receives additional shares if the predetermined goals have 
been met. This result in an alignment between performance and number of matching shares 
received.
 72
  
2.4.2.3. Restricted stocks awards 
The Restricted Stock Award (RSA) plan uses future shares to reward the employee. This plan is 
a conditional grant of shares or units and contingent upon employment during a lock-in period. 
This vehicle gives the employee immediate value on the date of grant. The lock-in can use 
performance targets in order for the plan to pay out.
73
 The lock-in period is usually three to five 
years. If the employee terminates the employment, the shares or units are forfeited.  After the 
lock-in period, the employee receives the shares.
 74
 If the RSA requires an equity issuance it must 
be proposed and approve by the AGM.
75
  
2.4.3. Cash-based plans 
2.4.3.1. Synthetic option plan 
A Synthetic option plan uses synthetic options, which is an option that does not give the holder 
the right to purchase a share at date of exercise. Synthetic options are a cash-based instrument, 
which gives the holder the right to a cash-settlement equal to the share price appreciation at the 
date of expiry. The valuation of the synthetic option is similar to other option types, normally by 
the Black Scholes model. The Synthetic option plan does not require equity issuance, so dilution 
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can be avoided.
76
 This plan deviates from other incentive plans as it does not give ownership of 
company stock, which can be viewed as a negative aspect. The use of Synthetic option plan has 
decreased over the past years as cash settlement has a direct impact on the company’s financial 
result. In other incentive plans, costs are bounded to the whole company ownership and not 
strictly to the balance sheet.
77
 Synthetic options are more attractive for smaller companies. It 
allows the company to issue options that are tied to the share price performance and at date of 
exercise, the employee does not have to find a buyer of the share.
78
   
2.4.3.2. Restricted stocks units 
The Restricted Stock Unit (RSU) plan uses a condition grant of units contingent upon 
employment during a lock-in period. This plan has similar structure to a RSA plan. The lock-in 
can use performance targets in order for the plan to pay out.
79
 The lock-in period is usually three 
to five years. If the employee leaves the company, the units are forfeited.  After the lock-in 
period, the employee receives the value of the units as a cash-settlement. It is beneficial to use 
restricted stock unit in cyclical industries where share price fluctuates.
80
  Cash settled RSU plans 
do not require approval by shareholders.
81
 
2.4.3.3. Phantom shares  
This is a modified synthetic option plan.  The plan does not permit the employee to own shares, 
it is called phantom share as the ‘shares’ do not really exist. Two types of plans are market-
value-based and non-market value-based, following either share price or financial measures. 
Alike synthetic options, the employee receives a cash-settlement at the end of the plan period.
82
  
2.4.3.4. Profit sharing 
Under this plan, all participating employees are granted an equal share of a cash bonus in a profit 
sharing scheme.
83
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2.4.4. Convertible loans 
Today convertible loans are not a common instrument to use, as they are perceived as rather 
tedious. Bonds are debt instruments that give the employee the right to convert the debenture 
into a number of shares at a given price. For the issuer, this reduces the cash interest payment 
and when the convertibles are converted into shares, the company debt vanishes. If the stock 
price does not exceed the conversion price, the employee can retain the nominal value of the 
convertible. Convertible loans result in a share ownership dilution. 
84
  
3. Empirical methodology 
3.1. Research approach 
There are two different approaches when conducting a study; inductive and deductive. In a 
deductive approach, an empirical study uses existing theory and extends previous research. New 
data is obtained and new hypothesis are formulated in order to be tested to find empirical result 
with new conclusions and perspectives on the existing theories. Inductive research is the 
opposite where the research results in a new theory.
85
 The research approach in this study is a 
deductive approach where existing theories and previous results are provided on the topic.  
3.1.1. Quantitative and Qualitative research 
Quantitative research is defined as collection of numerical data and is a relationship between 
theory and research in a deductive matter. In such a study, the steps is to; collect existing 
research, formulate a new hypothesis deducted from previous theory, collect new data and 
statistically test the hypothesis in order to provide empirical result.
86
 This study will conduct 
quantitative research in an econometric study. Three sample groups have been selected and will 
be tested independently. The data is collected from AGM protocols, annual reports and other 
external sources. This study uses a one-sided hypothesis test, where the analysis test null 
hypotheses with multiple regression models using dependent and independent variables. If the 
regression results are significant the null hypotheses can be rejected, which indicates that the 
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alternative hypotheses are true.
87
  The reliability and validity of the study will be discussed 
further in the next section. 
3.1.2. Reliability and Validity  
Reliability and validity is a consistency measure of a data set. This can be verified using various 
approaches and statistical tests.
88
 Statistical tests will be made on the regression to avoid 
potential errors, with the aim of increasing reliability and validity of the result. The variables 
used in this analysis will be tested using linear hypothesis tests and t-statistics. This study aims to 
reach as high reliability as possible. There is a human error risk factor on the data collected from 
annual reports and AGM protocols. This factor should be negligible as transparency is high in 
Swedish corporate governance disclosure. The information in the annual reports annual reports 
are secondary data where the companies publish the reports, therefore the validity should be 
high, as both internal auditors and external accountants have reviewed it. Other financial data is 
collected from a well-known database used by many researchers, therefore should provide 
sufficient financial information. The books used in this study are well-known theorists that 
provide a reliable source of information. Most of the journals present existing theories and 
previous econometric studies conducted. However, the reliability and validity of the results 
provided in the journals can be discussed and data tend to be noisy and conclusions rather weak.  
3.1.3. Limitations 
This study only focuses on public companies in Sweden. The data sample is rather limited and 
consists of 221 companies; 65 large cap, 50 mid cap and 106 small cap companies. Some 
observations have been eliminated due to missing proxy statement, missing data or irregular 
financial activities.  The hypotheses are tested on a three-year period, as most LTI plans have a 
three-year vesting period until expiry date. Due to difficulties finding annual reports before 2009, 
the study only focuses on plans that started 2009. There are some limitations to the regression 
models due to lack of data. The second hypothesis regarding the use of instruments only 
investigates the use of shares and options, while there are multiple different design structures of 
LTI plans. The third hypothesis test the impact LTI has on corporate governance. This test is 
rather limited as there are multiple factors that influence corporate governance. This study solely 
focuses on the aspects of corporate governance that arises from the agency theory. 
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3.1.4. Target group 
The target of this essay is academics and students with an economic or finance background. The 
study does not require previous knowledge of remuneration policies or knowledge about 
financial incentive schemes. This study does not provide any indication on what financial 
incentive is preferable and will only investigate if the LTI plans fulfil its purpose.  
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4. Empirical study 
4.1. Data 
This study employs data from public companies listed on Nasdaq OMX Stockholm. LTI data has 
been obtained from public sources such as annual reports and AGM protocols. Companies’ 
websites have been used as a secondary resource to find more information regarding the plans. 
As there is a high disclosure about remuneration in Swedish companies, it has been easy to 
obtain information about the remuneration schemes. The data sample is from the period 2009 to 
2012. I have collected information about all listed companies long-term incentive schemes in 
Sweden within this period. The sample consists of companies that launched a program in 2009 
and companies that do not have any LTI plan in place. I have eliminated companies that 
launched a program 2008, 2010 and 2011 but not 2009 as it might have a misleading effect on 
the result. When companies have had more than one program in place, I have collected data 
solely on the programs that are aimed at the executive management group. The financial data has 
been retrieved from Datastream, which is a licensed Thompson Reuter electronic database. The 
data sample has been constructed based on data available. If there has been missing data from 
Datastream the observations have been eliminated from the data set.  
4.1.1. Criticism of data sources 
The sources are secondary data from annual reports, AGM protocols and the Datastream 
database. The financial data in the annual reports and AGM protocols should to be accurate as it 
is regulated by financial reporting standards and approved by the companies itself. The 
information obtained from Datastream cannot be fully verified to provide accurate information. 
However, Datastream is supposed to be a trustworthy source of information as many researchers 
use this database.  
4.1.2. Sample selection  
Data has been collected on 221 companies and 31 has been eliminated due to missing proxy 
statements, missing data from Datastream or heavily irregular financial activities during the 
period.  
The sample consists of 190 listed companies on Nasdaq OMX Stockholm during the period 2009 
to 2012. The observations are companies that launched an LTI plan at AGM 2009 or that did not 
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have an LTI plan in use. The observations are divided into three control groups by listing; large 
cap, mid cap and small cap. The sample is limited to the Swedish Stock exchange in order to 
identify the LTI market in Sweden. I have conducted analysis on all three listings separately to 
identify any differences between company size and maturity of the firms. The regression also 
uses industry groups as dummy variables to investigate any differences between industries.  
4.1.3. Variables 
I have used the change in EBITDA between the start of the LTI plan (2009) and end of the 
program (2012) to investigate any potential growth related to the LTIs. I have used EBITDA as a 
growth variable as it reflects the profitability of a company. Over time, change in profit should 
reflect firm performance. Previous studies have used Tobin Q to measure performance, which is 
Market Value/Total Assets. I have decided not to follow this approach with the assumption that 
the change in EBITDA provides a better estimate of long-term value creation. In order to control 
for the growth variable in the regression, the following control variables are used; firm size, 
leverage and industry.  The proxy for firm size variable is log of Total Assets and the proxy for 
leverage is debt-to-equity ratio. To control for industries the sample is divided into 5 industry 
groups according to the Global Industry Classification Standard
89
. Following Huselid
90
 I have 
also constructed a regression investigating the impact of LTI on employee turnover and leverage.  
Due to missing data, this regression is restricted to the large cap list.   
4.1.4. Correlation and causality 
Statistical tests have been conducted to monitor for possible error in the correlations between 
variables. In order for the OLS regression to be consistent, the variables have to be exogenous, 
unbiased and there should exist no multicollinearity.
91
  To control for multicollinearity additional 
control variables have been added to the regression models. For the OLS regression to be of 
BLUE, the errors have to be uncorrelated and homoscedastic. If the errors are not homoscedastic 
then there exist heteroskedasticity, which means that the estimates of the variance of the 
coefficients are biased.
92
 I have tested for heteroskedasticity using a linear hypothesis test to 
verify if the independent variables are jointly significant or not. After performing this test, I have 
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concluded that all models are significant as a whole. The regression has been adjusted to control 
for heteroscedasticity-consistent (HC) standard errors by using an HC-function and White test in 
the model. 
4.2. Descriptive statistics  
Table 1 shows a summary of all companies in each listing. The companies in each listing vary in 
firm size. Companies listed on large cap, mid cap and small cap have a market capitalization in 
the following ranges; over SEK 100 billion, SEK 100 billion to 1.5 billion and below SEK 1.5 
billion. Table 1 to 3 provides statistical data on each group. Table 4 to 6 shows correlation 
between all variables and can be found in Appendix.   
Table 1. Summary number of companies 
 Large cap Mid cap Small cap 
Energy, Material,  Capital goods 23 14 30 
Retail, Consumer goods,  Media 8 11 11 
Healthcare, Pharma, Biotech 4 5 15 
Diversified financials, Real estate  14 9 3 
Telecom, Software 6 7 30 
Total 55 46 89 
 
Table 2. Instruments used in plans 
No. of companies  Large cap  Mid cap Small cap All 
Shares 23 4 2 29 
Options  9 19 21 59 
Cash-settlement 6 2 0 8 
Total 38 25 23 96 
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Table 3. Summary statistics 
 Large cap Mid cap Small cap 
 median mean median mean median mean 
%-EBITDA change 2009 and 2012 27% 103% 42% 118% 40% 74% 
Total Assets (MSEK) 2012 34.9 287.6  3.0 5.8 0.5 0.8 
Leverage (Debt-to-Equity) 2012 66.03 124.73 51.37 78.87 27.61 41.13 
Employee turnover 2012 7.253 8.133 NA NA NA NA 
 
5. Empirical Result  
 
The model uses a fixed effect regression on panel data. I have examined if the use of LTI plans 
have an impact on firm performance. Table 4 to 8 presents the regression result in each group. 
To test the first two null hypothesis I have used four regressions on each group, whereof three 
regressions are on the percentage change in EBITDA (year 2009 to 2012) and LTI, and one 
regression on the instruments used. In addition, all companies are tested in a combined group in 
order to test a larger sample. The third null hypothesis is tested in two regressions, one using 
employee turnover as a dependent variable and one using the level of leverage as a dependant 
variable. This test is restricted to the large cap group. 
Null Hypothesis 1. H0: LTI plans do not increase firm performance in Swedish listed 
companies. 
Model 1. 
% 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴2009,2012  = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐿𝑇𝐼 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠) + 𝛽3𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 
+  𝛽3𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 + ɛ 
 
Model 2. 
% 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴2009,2012  = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐿𝑇𝐼 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠) + 𝛽3𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 + ɛ 
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Model 3.  
(Reduced model) 
% 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴2009,2012  = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐿𝑇𝐼 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠) + ɛ 
 
Null Hypothesis 2. H0: There is no correlation between type of instruments used and firm 
performance in Swedish listed companies..  
 
Model 4. 
% 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴2009,2012  = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠 + 𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠) + 𝛽3𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠
+ ɛ 
 
The result in table 4 model 1 to 3, shows an insignificant correlation between the change in 
EBITDA and LTI plans in the large cap group. This means that the first null hypothesis cannot 
be rejected. A possible reason is that most large cap companies have an LTI plan, therefore it is 
difficult to measure potential effects. The data in the large cap group are rather noisy as the 
companies are large in size, which indicated that the firms are heavily influenced by factors other 
than managerial decisions. The models uses different amount of control variables, model 1 
including industry dummies does not have an impact on the result. Model 4 also shows 
insignificant correlation which means that second null hypothesis cannot be rejected and the 
alternative hypothesis is false. 
[Table 4] 
The result in table 5 model 1 to 3, shows a significant correlation between the change in 
EBITDA and LTIs in the mid cap group, with a significance level of 95%. However, F-statistics 
< 10 shows that the result is rather weak and the p-value suggest that only model 3 holds. The p-
value is close to zero which indicates that the independent variable is related to the change in the 
dependant variable determined by the determinant of coefficient (β). This indicates that these 
plans may have a larger effect in medium-size companies and the first null hypothesis can be 
rejected. A possible reason is that the organisational structure and the management’s level of 
responsibilities differ from larger companies. This shows some evidence that the underlying 
theory of the agency problem is relevant, implying that the “control” mechanism of LTIs may be 
useful for shareholders. However, potential noisiness to the data may distort the result, hence we 
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should be careful to draw conclusions. In model 1-2, when including control variables the 
coefficient value increases. In model 4 there is a significant correlation between change in 
EBITDA and shares. This means that the second null hypothesis can be rejected and the 
alternative hypothesis is true.   
[Table 5] 
The result in table 6 model 1 to 3, shows a significant correlation between the change in 
EBITDA and LTIs in the small cap group, with a significance level of 99%. However, F-
statistics < 10 shows that the result is rather weak and the p-value suggest that only model 1 
holds. This means that the first null hypothesis can be rejected. The significance is stronger than 
the mid cap group but the result is weaker. In model 1-2, when including control variables the 
significance increases, which indicates that the variables captures potential errors. In model 4 
there is a significant correlation between change in EBITDA and options. This means that the 
second null hypothesis can be rejected and the alternative hypothesis is true.   
[Table 6] 
The result in table 7 model 1 to 3, shows a significant correlation between the change in 
EBITDA and LTIs in the all groups combined, group, with a significance level of 100%. This 
means that the first null hypothesis can be rejected when testing all groups combined. The p-
value indicates that model 1 and 3 holds. 
[Table 7] 
Null Hypothesis 3. H0: LTI plans do not have a measurable impact on corporate governance in 
Swedish listed companies.  
 
Model 5. 
𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒 𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐿𝑇𝐼 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠)+𝛽3𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴 + ɛ 
 
Model 6. 
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐿𝑇𝐼 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠)+𝛽3𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴 + ɛ 
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The result in table 8, model 5, shows a significant correlation between the level of employee 
turnover and LTIs in the large cap group with a significance level of 95%. The result in model 6, 
shows an insignificant result on the level of leverage and LTI. This suggests that then null 
hypothesis cannot be somewhat rejected as it does have an impact on employee turnover.  
[Table 8] 
 
5.1. Conclusion 
 
In this essay I have investigated the relationship between LTI plans and firm performance. The 
underlying assumption is that if companies incentivise long-term, management tend to perform 
better. The regression tests LTI on profit growth over a period of time, employee turnover and 
leverage. The analysis on firm performance is significant in medium and small-size companies. 
A possible reason is that medium and small-size companies recognize the importance to invest in 
talent, therefore human capital is a central factor for growth. However, there is a possibility of 
casualty in the result if better performing firms are more likely to invest in LTI plans. Another 
possible reason why the incentive effect is more evident in smaller firms is fewer layers of 
management and a more centralized decision-making structure, i.e. fewer people have authority 
and mandate to make financial decisions. The top-down approach to motivate lower level 
employees, as according to Fama
93
, may be more distinguishable in smaller firms as 
communication is often in-person. Another factor is a scarcer allocation of resources meaning 
that financial incentives are reviewed more closely. This will in return create an upward pressure 
on management to perform better. Along these lines, the outcome from managerial decisions is 
more evident to outside investors. A more quantifiable reason is that smaller firms are more 
inclined to leverage operational costs to increase growth, given cost savings and tight margins. 
Smaller firms have higher operational efficiencies and tend to be in a growth stage. In the 
analysis, there are no industry specific results, suggesting that the LTI effect does not depend on 
the industry. The insignificant results in large-size companies were quite expected. There are 
multiple economic aspects regarding company size that have an impact on the result. Larger 
companies tend to have a more complex reporting structure, more layers of management and 
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longer decision-making processes, which affects overall efficiency. Furthermore, large-size firms 
have a more global geographic spread where growth can be applied to different markets. This 
results in a larger exposure to external factors such as market expectations, macroeconomic 
influences and economic cycles. Another reason why incentive effect may be hampered is that 
shareholders cannot monitor managerial decisions. The overall result in this study suggests that 
LTI plans have a measurable effect in medium and small-size companies. If high growth firms 
have more asymmetric information, as argued by Bizjak
94
, the result in this study provides 
evidence that LTI plans reduce the agency problem in medium and small-size companies. The 
extended analysis testing instruments provide significant result in the mid-cap and small-cap list. 
A possible reason in the mid-cap list is the increased number of companies using performance 
shares as incentive schemes to link pay and performance. The performance goals attached to this 
plan creates clearer objectives for the management, which may result in a higher incentive effect. 
In the small cap list the use of option plans show significant result, which is the most prevalent 
plan for smaller companies. Furthermore, the additional analysis on the large cap list shows 
significance on employee turnover and no significance on leverage. The result on employee 
turnover shows supports to existing studies that financial incentives succeed in retaining key 
employees, as argues by Fama
95
. The insignificant result obtained using leverage as a measure of 
risk, implies that this agency effect have not been proven in this study. This effect requires 
further studies and analysis. 
The pervading theme of this essay is LTI plans, performance and the agency theory effect. This 
essay has provided some empirical evidence by econometric analyses that incentivizing can be 
associated with increased profit in Sweden. The overall conclusion is that long-term incentives 
increases firm performance but there is no measurable impact in large companies. LTI do 
succeed in retaining employees but the change in risk behaviour is not quantifiable.  
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5.2. Further research  
The topic of long-term incentive plans in companies is an evolving topic, which requires 
continuous research as the market changes. The existing theory is comprehensive but requires 
stronger econometric evidence in order to prove if it fulfils its purpose. Further empirical study 
should investigate the use of performance targets in the plan structure, as this is increasing on the 
market. Another empirical study should investigate growth opportunities in Swedish companies 
and the use of financial incentives, to analyse potential impact on investment decisions, as this is 
an important managerial decision.  
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7. Appendix 
 
Table 4. Regression on Large cap list – Firm performance 
 Dependent variable %-EBITDA change 2009 and 2012 
Independent variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Intercept -2.4727 (-0.453) -0.5341 (-0.121) -1.1625 (-0.327) 1.66 (0.417) 
LTI 0.6595 (0.831) 0.7246 (0.961) 0.6289 (0.862) Not included 
Shares Not included Not included Not included 0.05 (0.082)    
Options Not included Not included Not included 0.55 (0.717)  
Log(T_A) 0.2716 (  0.853) 0.1124 (0.482) 0.1590 (0.782) 0.01(0.033)     
Leverage -0.0016 (-0.725) Not included Not included -0.00 (-0.156)    
Industry dummy (Energy, 
Material,  Capital goods) 
-1.0587 (-0.873) 0.7118 (0.741) Not included Not included 
Industry dummy 
(Healthcare, Pharma, 
Biotech) 
-1.0740 (-0.737) -0.4687 (-0.303) Not included Not included 
Industry dummy (Retail, 
Consumer goods,  Media) 
-0.3630 (-0.336) -0.3848 (-0.283) Not included Not included 
Industry dummy 
(Telecom, Software) 
-1.2010 (-1.024) -0.5799 (-0.445) Not included Not included 
Industry dummy 
(Diversified financials, 
Real estate) 
Excluded Excluded Excluded Excluded 
Adjusted R
2 
-0.0627 0 0 0.01003 
Regression p-value 0.7761 0.7302 0.4549 0.3301 
F-statistics 0.5701 0.5982 0.8003 1.172 
Number of observation 55 55 55 55 
1. t-values are in the parentheses 
2. Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
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Table 5. Regression on Mid cap list – Firm performance 
 Dependent variable %-EBITDA change 2009 and 2012 
Independent variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Intercept 
2.75 (0.605)     5.3 (2.285)* 12.76 
(2.919)** 
15.66 (2.974)** 
LTI 1.13 (2.310)* 1.67 (2.130)* 1.65 (2.219)* Not included 
Shares Not included Not included Not included 2.0463354(0.602)    
Options Not included Not included Not included 2.3984231(3.845)*** 
Log(T_A) -0.14 (-0.453)   -0.92 (-2.219)* -0.78 (-2.676)* 0.6109621(1.211)     
Leverage 0.00 (0.313)    Not included -0.0535091 (-0.229)   
Industry dummy 
(Energy, Material,  
Capital goods) 
0.54 (0.690) -0.63 (-0.534)  Not included Not included 
Industry dummy 
(Healthcare, Pharma, 
Biotech) 
-0.06 (-0.051) -1.36 (-0.752) Not included Not included 
Industry dummy 
(Retail, Consumer 
goods,  Media) 
1.05 (1.224)  -0.28 (-0.219) Not included Not included 
Industry dummy 
(Telecom, Software) 
0.01 (0.007)  -0.40 (-0.249) Not included Not included 
Industry dummy 
(Diversified financials, 
Real estate) 
Excluded  Excluded Excluded Excluded 
Adjusted R
2 
0.1169 0.1242 0.1899 0.1786 
Regression p-value 0.13 0.08001 0.004065 0.01621 
F-statistics 1.756 2.064 6.275 3.899 
Number of observation 46 46 46 46 
1. t-values are in the parentheses 
2. Signif. Codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
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Table 6. Regression on Small cap list – Firm performance 
 Dependent variable %-EBITDA change 2009 and 2012 
Independent variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Intercept  2.69(1.502)   1.88609 (0.905) 1.88330 (0.942) 2.49 (1.387) 
LTI  0.93 (2.679)** 0.97984 (2.253)* 0.93828 (2.263)* Not included 
Shares Not included Not included Not included 0.14 (0.190)    
Options Not included Not included Not included  1.13 (2.982)** 
Log(T_A) -0.093 (-0.654)   -0.02321  (-0.145) -0.02545 (-0.167) -0.08 (-0.544)    
Leverage -0.001 (-0.312)    Not included Not included -0.00 (-0.286)   
Industry dummy (Energy, 
Material,  Capital goods) 
0.15 (0.315)    -0.17532 (0.312) Not included Not included 
Industry dummy 
(Healthcare, Pharma, 
Biotech) 
0.20 (0.499)    -0.13384 (-0.265) Not included Not included 
Industry dummy (Retail, 
Consumer goods,  Media) 
0.69(0.916)     0.31087 (0.333) Not included Not included 
Industry dummy 
(Telecom, Software) 
0.29 (0.809)  -0.01408 (-0.033) Not included Not included 
Industry dummy 
(Diversified financials, 
Real estate) 
Excluded Excluded Excluded Excluded 
Adjusted R
2 
0.06381 -0.01025 0.03804 0.07244 
Regression p-value 0.05329 0.5238 0.0837 0.05442 
F-statistics 2.681 0.8664 2.562 2.445 
Number of observation 89 89 89 89 
1. t-values are in the parentheses 
2. Signif. Codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
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Table 7. Regression on All companies – Firm performance 
 Dependent variable %-EBITDA change 2009 and 2012 
Independent variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Intercept 2.31 (1.721).   2.10170 (0.995) 2.46282(2.318)* 2.34(1.863).  
LTI  1.34  (3.671)*** 1.20554 
(3.403)*** 
1.17019(3.394)*** Not included 
Shares Not included Not included Not included 1.42 (2.806)** 
Options Not included Not included Not included Not included 
Log(T_A) -0.056 (-0.611)     -0.06683 (-0.804) -0.06853(-0.938) -0.046 (-0.512)    
Leverage  -0.00 (-0.226)   Not included Not included 0.00(0.314)    
Industry dummy 
(Energy, Material,  
Capital goods) 
-0.33 (-0.636)   0.48213 (0.305) Not included Not included 
Industry dummy 
(Healthcare, Pharma, 
Biotech) 
 -0.19 (-0.349)    0.07571 (0.047) Not included Not included 
Industry dummy 
(Retail, Consumer 
goods,  Media) 
-0.22 (-0.377)    0.20444 (0.125) Not included Not included 
Industry dummy 
(Telecom, Software) 
0.03 (0.069)   0.23540 (0.147) Not included Not included 
Industry dummy 
(Diversified financials, 
Real estate) 
Excluded Excluded Excluded Excluded 
Adjusted R
2 
0.04087 0.02801 0.05091 0.03029 
Regression p-value 0.05607 0.1043 0.003727 0.04516 
F-statistics 2.017 1.733 5.774 2.739 
Number of observation 190 190 190 190 
1. t-values are in the parentheses 
2. Signif. Codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
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Table 8. Regression on Large Cap – Employee Turnover and Leverage 
                     Dependent variable  
Employee Turnover            Leverage 
Independent variables Model 5 Model 6 
Intercept 4.04 (0.346) -9.99 (-2.140) * 
LTI -5.69 (-1.930) . -1.35(-0.243)   
Log(T_A) 0.49 (0.737)   6.09 (2.162)* 
EBITDA 0.05602 6.21 (1.949). 
Adjusted R
2 
0.1553 0.4823 
Regression p-value 1.979 0 
F-statistics 4.04 (0.346) 16.84 
Number of observation 36 (19 variables deleted 
due to missing data) 
55 
1. t-values are in the parentheses 
2. Signif. Codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’  
 
 
 
